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In The Supreme Court
of the State of Utah
STATE OF UTAH,

Plain tiff-Respondent,
vs.

REBECCA M. JIMINEZ,
Defendant-Appellant.

Case No.

11346

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
The appellant appeals from the judgment oI the
conviction of second degree murder and the trial
court's denial of motions to suppress and for a new
trial.

DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
Appella_nt was charged by information with the
crime of murder in the second degree. Appellant's
counsel moved to suppress any and all statements
made by the defendant at her interrogation. The
Court denied defendant's motion. The defendant
was tried by jury for the crime of second degree
murder. The jury returned a verdict of guilty and de-

2
fendant moved for a new trial. The motion was 0,
nied and deiendant was sentenced to the Utah Sta;.
Prison.
.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Respondent seeks a determination by the Cour
of whether the appellant's confession was made dur
ing custodial interrogation. If the Court conclude:
that it was not so made, respondent seeks affirmanc:
of the conviction. If the Court finds the confessior
to have been madE· during custodial interrogatior.
respondent seeks reversal of the judgment of cor
viction, vacation of the denial of respondent':
motions for new trial and to suppress her confe&,
sion, and remand for a new trial.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Near the hour of midnight on January 14, 1960
Salt Lake City police officers arrived at an apartmeri
at 852 South West Temple to investigate a repor
that a man had been injured. Upon their arrival, they
found the body of Manuel Ray Jiminez on a bed. 11.
connection with the investigation of the death, a~
pellant was taken to Salt Lake City Police Headquar·
ters shortly before 12:30 a.m. on January 15 (R.57).
Officer Elton testified that at the time he arrived a:
the apartment, appellant was "visibly upset" (R.45)
and that at this time she was a "suspect" in the cas"'
~R.37).

At :he police station, appellant was questioned
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three different times between the hours of 1:30
a.m. and 4:00 a.m. (R.267-271). During the first interrogation period, Officers Cahoon and Wesley were
present with the appellant, who was otherwise alone
in the interrogation room CR.267). Before any questioning began, Officer Cahoon advised appellant
that she had the right to remain silent, that any statements she might make could be used against her
and that she could consult with an attorney (R.51,67).
Officer Cahoon testified that appellant was "not specifically" under suspicion at the time of the first interrogation <R.51), which lasted for 25 to 30 minutes
(R.58). The record does not disclose the nature of the
questions asked, nor the responses given during the
first period of questioning, but there is testimony that
appellant's account of the events earlier that evening
was fraught with "discrepancies" (R.269).
3t

The second interrogation began at some time
between 2:30 a.m. and 3: 15 a.m. (R.54,269), and lasted
from ten (R.58) to 25 minutes (R.271). During this
questioning period, Officers Cahoon, Shields, Elton
and Wesley were present with the defendant in the
interrogation room (R.54). There is testimony that·at
this time, appellant was "under suspicion" of having
killed the deceased (R.51,61), and that the purpose of" questioning her a second time was to investigate
"several discrepancies'' in appellant's statement during the first period of questioning (269). The officers
discussed with appellant the possibility of her involvement in the crime (R.60), and questioned her
reqarding what appeared to be blood stains on her
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skirt and nails (H.66). Appellant was asked to submit
to a sample scraping of her nails (R.54), but this was
not done until the third questioning period (R.292).
During this second interrogation, appellant implicated another man in the killing (R.54). She was then
asked to submit to a polygraph test, but refused (R.
66). As a result of the second period of questioning,
another officer was sent back to the apartment building to recover a knife suspected to have been used
to stab the deceased (R.271).
The third interrogation period began "around
4:00 a.m." and lasted only a short time (R.58,271). Officers Shields and Cahoon were present with appellant, who was then the "sole suspect" in the case
(R.55,51). Again the blood stains on appellant's skirt
and nails were discussed, and Officer Cahoon took
a sample scraping from appellant's nails (R.292). Officer Cahoon then left the interrogation room, whereupon appellant confessed to having stabbed the deceased, and described the events surrounding the
stabbing (R.292). Appellant was then formally placed
under arrest (R.240). When asked if she would give
a signed statement she refused, stating that she warited to see an attorney, whereupon the questioning
ceased and an attorney was called for her (R.300).
Other relevant portions of the record disclose
that at some time prior to the confession, appellant
stated that she didn't wish to have counsel (R.63). It
also appears that the officers, prior to questioning
her, told her that if she was tired, she could lie down,

and that she could go to the fodies room if necessary
(R.66). She was given a cup of coffee (R.66). Appellant's son-in-law was present at the police station,
but it does not clearly appear in the record that appellant ever reque~ted to see him (R.64). Officer Cahoon testified tha.t appellant could have left the police station at any time prior to formal arrest (R.282).
Finally, with respect to the warnings given appellant, the record shows that, while the appellant
was warned of her right to remain silent, that anything she might say _could be used against her, and
that she could consult with an attorney (R.51,67,82),
she was at no time prior to making incriminating
statements advised that if she could not afford an
attorney one would be appointed in her behalf. Indeed, two of the interrogating officers testified
that no such warning was given (R.63,88).

ARGUMENT
POINT I
APPELLANT WAS NOT SUBJECTED TO CUSTODIAL INTERROGATION PRIOR TO CONFESSING TO
THE CRIME.

This case presents an important issue of constitutional dimensions in the administration of the principiles announced in Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S.
436 (1966). It is the respondent's position that there is
here presented a single question for determination
by this Court, viz., whether appellant was undergoing "custodial interrogation" at the time she confess-

ed to the crime and related the attendant details to
pclice officers. It is not questioned that the full complement of warnings required by Miranda were not
given to appellant, nor that her confession was ad
mitted at trial in evidence against her over a time1y objection and motion to suppress (R.115). Further
even though the record discloses that appellant indicated prior to her confession that she did not wish
to have an attorney, no effective waiver of her rights
was ever made, for Miranda makes it clear that one
cannot waive right~, of which he has not been fully
advised, 384 U.S. at 479. Accordingly, the case is reduced to an examination of the surrounding circumstances in order to determine whether appellant's
confession was made during "custodial interrogation" within the purview of Miranda.
We must begin with Miranda itself, where the
court spoke of "custodial interrogation" in the following terms:
By custodial interrogation, we mean questioning
initiated by law enforcement officers after a person has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant
way. This is what we meant in Escobedo when we
spoke of an investigation which had focused on an
accused. 384 U.S. at 444 & id., n. 4.

\Afhile it seems clear that one who has been arrested or physically restrained is within "custody"
for the purposes of Miranda, Lathers v. U.S., 396 F.2d
524 (5th Cir. i 968), People v. McKay, 29 App.Div.2d
834, 287 N.Y.S.2d 795 (Sup. Ct. 1968), the unfortunate-
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ly imprecise formulation contained in the phrase
"otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any
significant way" has created difficulty in the ad hoc
decision of cases v.rhere there has been no formal
3.rrest or actual physical restraint. Indeed, the legacy
uf Miranda has been a growing volume of cases
turning on this single point. The case at bar is the
first in our state to join ranks with such decisions.
The cases which have dealt with the problem
here presented indicate that the place of questioning
is perhaps the most significant fact in determining
whether incriminatory or exculpatory statements
were made during custodial interrogation. Generally, it may be said that interrogation which takes place
in a police station will be found to have been custodial, Lathers v. United States, 396 F.2d 524 (5th Cir.
1968); U.S. v. Harrison, 265 F.Supp. 660 (S.D.N.Y.
1967); Commonwealth v. Banks, 429 Pa 53, 239 A.2d
416 (1968); People v. Golwitzer, 52 Misc.2d 925, 277
N.Y.S.2d 209 (Sup. Ct. 1966), and the four cases decided in Miranda involved police station interrogations,
384 U.S. at 491, 493, 495, 497. In a dictum, the Court
of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit has said that custodial interrogation "certainly includes all stationhouse or police car questioning by the police for
there the 'potential for compulsion' is obvious." U.S.
v. Gibson, 392 F.2d 173, 376 (4th Cir. 1968). Yet there
are cases which disprove the broad assumption
ma_de in Gibson. For example, station-house questioning was found not to amount to custodial interrogation in People v. Williams, 56 Misc.2d 837, 290
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N.Y.S.2d 321 (Sup. Ct. 1968). There, a police offic,
had been questioned at the station-house regardin
the whereabouts of his automobile at the time•
crime had been committed. On the basis tha1 ft
could not reasonably have believed himself to hav,
been restrained, the court held that his statemen~
given during interrogation were admissible despi'that Miranda warnings had not been given. Andi:
Campbell v. State, 4 Md.App. 448, 243 A.2d 643 (19o1
statements made by a defendant in a police car afle:'
arrest were held not to have been made durir
custodial interrogation. See also State v. Travis, ....
Ore. _______ , 441 P.2d 597 (1968) (questioning in polic:
car held not custodial interrogation).
Other cases jndicate that the Miranda warning:
may apply to questioning which takes place othe:
than at the police station. See, e.g., Windsor v. m.,
389 F.2d 530 (5th Cir. 1968) (defendant's hotel room)
U.S. v. Turzynski, 268 F.Supp. 847 (N.D. Ill. 1967)(dr
fendant's clinic); Myers v. State, 3 Md.App. 534, 24[
A.2d 288 (1968) (police car); State v. Ross, 183 Neb.
157 N.W.2d 860 (1968) (defendant's hospital room:
Commonwealth v. Sites, 427 Pa. 486, 235 A.Zd 3~'
(1967) (defendant's home); Commonwealth v. Jeffer·
son. 423 Pa. 541, 226 A.2d 765 (1967) (hospital corr
dor).
1

The greatest number of reported cases, how
ever, have found that questioning which took placf
somewhere other than the station-house was nc
"custodial interrogation" within the meaning of Mu

,,.
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anda. A list of these cases appears in the Appendix,
infra.
It is apparent, therefore, that the place where
questioning occurs is not absolutely determinative
of the question of custodial interrogation; rather, the
entire circumstances surrounding the questioning
must be taken into account. See People v. P., 21 N.Y.
2d 1, 286 N.Y.S.2d 225 (1967).

In at least three American jurisdictions, the
question of custodial interrogation appears to involve not only the place of questioning, but the defendant's reasonable belief vel non that he is
deprived of his freedom of action. Thus, the court in
People v. Ha~el, 60 Cal. Reptr. 437, 252 Cal.App.2d
412 (Dist. Ct. App. 1967) stated:
(C)ustody occurs if a suspect is led to believe, as a
reasonable person, that he is being deprived or restricted of his freedom of action or movement .mder
pressures of official authority ... (T)he custody requirement of Miranda does not depend on the subjective intent of the law enforcement officer-interrogator but upon whether the suspect is physically
deprived of his freedom of action in any significant
way or is placed in a situation in which he reasonably believes that his freedom of action or movement is restricted by such interrogation. 60
Cal.Rptr. at 440. (Emphasis added.)
1
.

This rationale was adopted by the Maryland
court in Myers v. State, 3 Md.App. 534, 240 A.2d
(1968) and by the New York Court of Appeals in
Peo.ple v. P., 21 N.Y.2d 1, 286 N.Y.S.2d 225 (1967).

10
Let us examine the circumstances in the instant
case. It is respondent's contention that there are facts
of record which show that appellant's confession
was not made during custodial interrogation. At the
time she confessed, appellant was not under arrest;
in fact, one of the officers testified that he could not
have prevented appellant from leaving had she
wished to go. In addition, the "incommunicado" atmosphere of which Miranda speaks was not present
here, for the record shows that appellant was given
an opportunity to rest, to go to the ladies' room, and
to drink a. cup of coffee. And there is nothing to
shovv a deliberate design by the police to prevent
appellant from speaking with her son-in-law, who
was present at the station. Indeed, a reading of the
entire record discloses a conscious effort on the part
of the police to make appellant as comfortable as
possible under the circumstances. Further, no
lengthy questioning occurred here, and as soon as
appellant expressed a wish to see her attorney, the
questioning stopped. Finally, the record contains
nothing which indicates that the officers employed
coercive tactics of either an overt or a covert nature.
CONCLUSION
The case at bar admittedly presents a difficult
c:ruestion. anr:l the respondent is aware of the policies
v:rhich mav be asserted in support of appellant's
position. But equally compelling a.re the policy arguments in favor of affirming the conviction herein. A
distinguished jurist, dissenting in a case much like
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the case at bar, has made an eloquent appeal in support of the position respondent here asserts. Commonwealth v. Banks, 429 Pa. 52, 239 A.2d 416, 419
(Musmanno, J., dissenting). However, the respondent is also a.ware of its fundamental duty to assure
the just administration of the law:
The U.S. Attorney is the representative not of an
ordinary party to a controversy, but of a sovereign
whose obligation to govern impartially is as compelling as its obligation to govern at all; and whose
interest, therefore, in a criminal prosecution is not
that it shall win a case, but that justice shall be
done. Berger v. U.S., 295 U.S. 78, 88 (1935). (Opinion by Sutherland, J.)

Recognizing this obligation, and mindful of the
societal interests here in conflict, respondent respectfullv submits to this Court the difficult question
of whether appellant's confession was made during
custodial interrogation.
Respectfully submitted,
VERNON B. ROMNEY
Attorney General
JOSEPH P. McCARTHY
Assistant Attorney General
236 State Capitol Building
Salt Lake City, Utah
Attorneys for Respondent

